The Forecasting MachineOpen interactive report

Will the United States and Iran engage in nuclear warfare before the end of Donald Trump's second presidential term?

This question resolves Yes if, at any point before noon Eastern Time on January 20, 2029 (or the end of Donald Trump's second presidential term, whichever comes first), the armed forces or authorized state command of either the United States or Iran execute a nuclear attack against the military forces, territory, or official assets of the other nation. Nuclear attack is defined as the intentional detonation of a nuclear warhead or device during conflict.

Forecasted on

Forecast probabilities

  • Yes: 1.7%
  • No: 98.3%

Reasoning

TFM puts the probability of a nuclear attack by either the US or Iran on the other before noon ET on 20 January 2029 at about 2% (Yes 1.70%, No 98.30%). The main reason is that the war is still conventional and the US president has repeatedly ruled out nuclear use, while Iran has no reported assembled device or test.

Why

The conflict is conventional, and nuclear use against a non-nuclear adversary has not happened since 1945. The latest exchanges (US strikes on Qeshm Island, Iranian attacks on a US radar in Bahrain and activity in Kuwait) were conventional [a20, a37]. The retained sources report no nuclear use in wars between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states since 1945, including the current Iran war [b1, a25]. That source does not give a full list of cases or a denominator, so this is illustrative, not a measured frequency. Some sources also say doctrinal and normative constraints are eroding [a25].

The US president has said repeatedly that he would not use nuclear weapons on Iran. Trump said "I would not use" them on 16 October [a27] and "I don't need to do that" in a Politico interview reported 4 November [a108]. Earlier he said "I wouldn't use nuclear. We don't have to" [a59, a90]. These statements are reversible and not binding. The scenario that drew attention, a nuclear strike on Pickaxe Mountain, rests on Tucker Carlson's unverified claims. The White House said he "has no insight into military planning" [a52, a100]. Experts quoted call US nuclear use "highly unlikely" or "very unlikely" [a41, a100, a104]. Conventional options also remain, including repeated GBU-57 strikes, attacks on tunnel entrances and a reported ground-raid plan [a83, a104, a107]. Trump told Reuters he would discuss new major strikes "after the beginning of the year" [a68].

Iran has no reported weapon, so an Iranian nuclear attack is a remote path. None of the supplied sources reports an Iranian test, an assembled device or a decision to weaponize. That is an absence in these sources, not a verified finding. Iran is still an NPT party, withdrawal bills are registered but undecided, and Article X requires three months' notice [a2, a11]. North Korea took about three years from formal exit to a first test, and that test was low-yield [b2]. A first test would also not count as an attack on the other nation.

Why it could go the other way

The countries are already fighting, and nothing is settled diplomatically. Talks are far apart, and Iran has hardened its position since the midterms [a20, a46]. Pickaxe Mountain is estimated at 80–100 m deep in granite, beyond reliable conventional reach by some accounts [a83, a100]. The president alone holds nuclear launch authority [a90]. Iranian officials openly debate a doctrine shift after Ali Khamenei's killing [a33, a34, a35]. The IAEA cannot verify roughly 440 kg of 60% uranium [a39, a69, a82]. The forecasters differed mainly on weighting these factors: one reasoned from a roughly 3% starting point, citing the live war and the hardened target, while others stayed near 1%. The supplied reporting does not show nuclear use being considered, and the strongest claim is unverified. The remaining risk is a tail event over about 26 months.

What we don't know

- Not verified in the available evidence: whether classified US planning includes nuclear options. One source says there is no public evidence of such planning but that it cannot be ruled out [a25]. - Not verified: where the enriched uranium is and what Iran's current weapons-relevant activity is, because inspectors lack access [a69, a82]. - Uncertain because it lies in the future: whether talks resume, whether the war escalates after the new Congress convenes, and whether Iran gives NPT notice.

What would change this

- Official US signaling that nuclear options are on the table would raise it; the White House has so far dismissed such claims [a52]. - A resumed large-scale US campaign against Pickaxe Mountain that fails conventionally would raise it [a68]. - Iran giving formal Article X notice or a leadership decision to weaponize would raise it [a34, a79]. - A negotiated deal with IAEA access or uranium arrangements would lower it [a45, a55]. - A mass-casualty or WMD attack on US forces would raise it [a68].

Cited evidence